Colored men were good enough to fight under Washington. They are not good enough to fight under McClellan. They were good enough to fight under Andrew Jackson. They are not good enough to fight under Gen. Halleck. They were good enough to help win American Independence but they are not good enough to help preserve that independence against treason and rebellion. They were good enough to defend New Orleans but not good enough to defend our poor beleaguered Capital.³

Gentlemen, I have put thousands of muskets into the hands of loyal citizens of Tennessee, Kentucky, and Western North Carolina. They have said they could defend themselves, if they had guns. I have given them the guns. Now, these men do not believe in mustering in the negro. If I do it, these thousands of muskets will be turned against us. We shall lose more than we should gain.⁵

"Gentlemen, he said, 'I can't do it. I can't see it as you do. You may be right, and I may be wrong; but I'll tell you what I can do; I can resign in favor of Mr. Hamlin. Perhaps Mr. Hamlin could do it."⁶

"I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of a communication from the Adjutant-General of the Army, dated June 13, 1862, requesting me to furnish you with the information necessary to answer certain Resolutions introduced in the House of Representatives June 9, 1862, on the motion of the Hon. Mr. [Charles A.] Wickliffe, of Kentucky; their substance being to enquire:

1st – Whether I had organized, or was organizing, a regiment of fugitive slaves' in this department.

2d – Whether any authority had been given to me from the War Department for such an organization; and

3rd – Whether I had been furnished, by order of the War Department, with clothing, uniforms, arms, equipments, and so forth, for such a force?

Only have received the letter at a late hour this evening, I urge forward my answer in time for the steamer sailing to-morrow morning, – this haste preventing me from entering, as minutely as I could wish, upon many points of detail, such as the paramount important of the subject would seem to call for. But, in view of the near termination of the present session of Congress, and the wide-spread interest which must have been awakened by Mr. Wickliffe's resolutions. I prefer sending even this imperfect answer to waiting the period necessary for the collection of fuller and more comprehensive data.

To the first question, therefore, I reply: That no regiment of 'fugitive slaves' has been, or is being, organized in this department. There is, however, a fine regiment of loyal persons whose late masters are fugitive rebels – men who everywhere fly before the appearance of the national flag, leaving their loyal and unhappy servants behind them, to shift, as best they can, for themselves. So far, indeed, are the loyal persons composing the regiment from seeking to evade the presence of their late owners, that they are now, one and all, endeavoring with commendable zeal to acquire the drill and discipline requisite to place them in a position to go in full and effective pursuit of their fugacious and traitorous proprietors.

To the second question, I have the honor to answer that the instructions given to Brig.-Gen T.W. Sherman by the Hon. Simon Cameron, late Secretary of War, and turned over to me, by succession, for my guidance, do distinctly authorize me to employ 'all loyal persons offering their service in defence of the Union, and for the suppression of this rebellion,' in any manner I may see fit, or that circumstances may call for. There is no restriction as to the character or color of the persons to be employed or the nature of the employment – whether civil or military – in which their services may be used. I conclude, therefore, that I have been authorized to enlist 'fugitive slaves' as soldiers, could any such fugitives be found in this department. No such characters, however have yet appeared within view of our most advanced pickets, – the loyal negroes everywhere remaining on their plantations to welcome us, aid us, and supply us with food, labor and information. It is the masters who have in every instance been the 'fugitives,' running away from loyal slaves as well as loyal soldiers; and these, as yet, we have only partially been able to see – chiefly their heads over ramparts, or dodging behind trees, rifles in hand, in the extreme distance. In the absence of any 'fugitive master law,' the deserted slaves would be wholly without remedy had not the crime of treason given them right to pursue, capture and bring those persons of whose benignant protection they have been thus suddenly and cruelly bereft.

To the third interrogatory, it is my painful duty to reply that I have never received any specific authority for issue of clothing, uniforms, arms, equipments and so forth, to the troops in question, – my general instructions from Mr. Cameron, to employ them in any manner I might find necessary, and the military exigencies of the department and the country, being my only, but I trust, sufficient justification. Neither have I have any specific authority for supplying these persons with shovels, spades, and pickaxes, when employing them as laborers; nor with boats and oars, when using them as lighter-men; but these are not points included in Mr. Wickliffe's resolution. To me it seemed that liberty to employ men in any particular capacity implied and carried with it liberty, also, to supply them with the necessary tools; and, acting upon this faith, I have clothed[,] equipped, and armed the only loyal regiment yet raised in South Carolina, Georgia or Florida.

I must say, in vindication of my own conduct, that, had it not been for the many other diversified and imperative claims on my time and attention, a much more satisfactory result might to have been achieved; and that, in place of only one regiment, as at present, at least five or six well-drilled, and throughly acclimated regiments should, by this time, have been added to the loyal forces of the Union.

The experiment of arming the blacks, so far as I have made it, has been a complete and even marvellous [sic] success. They are sober, docile, attentive, and enthusiastic; displaying great natural capacities in acquiring the duties of the soldier. They are now eager beyond all things to take the field and be led into action; and it is the unanimous opinion of the offices who have had charge of them that, in the peculiarities of this climate and country, they will prove invaluable auxiliaries, fully equal to the similar regiments so long and successfully used by the British authorities in the West India Islands.

"In conclusion, I would say, it is my hope – there appearing no possibility of other reinforcements, owing to the exigencies of the campaign in the Peninsula – to have organized by the end of next fall, and be able to present to the government, from forty-eight too fifty thousand of these hardy and devoted soldiers.

Trusting that this letter may be made part of your answer to Mr. Wickliffe's resolutions, I have the honor to be...¹³

The conduct of the Government in revoking Gen. Fremont's Proclamation, and of McClellan's with the Army of the Potomac, in catching and returning escaped slaves, also had a tendency for some time to keep back even the free negroes of Virginia and Maryland. But this class of people never enlisted to any great numbers either before or after 1863, and there finally came to be a general want of spirit with them, while with the slave class there was a ready enthusiasm to enlist. Senator Wilson, of Massachusetts, was Chairman of the Committee of Military Affairs, and reported from that committee on the 8^th of July 1862, a bill authorizing the arming of negroes as a part of the army. The bill finally passed both houses and received the approval of the President on the 17^th of July, 1862. The battle for its success is as worthy of record as any fought by the Phalanx. The debate was characterized by eloquence and deep feelings on both sides. Says an account of the proceedings in Henry Wilson's 'Anti-slavery Measures of Congress:

Mr. Sherman (Rep.) Of Ohio said, 'The question arises, whether the people of the United States, struggle for national existence, should not employ these blacks for the maintenance of the Government. The policy heretofore pursued by the officers of the United States has been to repel this class of people from our lines, to refuse their services. They would have made the best spies; and yet they have been driven from our lines.' – 'I tell the President,' said Mr. Fessenden (Rep.) Of Maine, 'from my place here as a senator, I tell the generals of our army, they must reverse their practices and their course of proceeding on this subject ** I advise it here from my place, – treat your enemies as enemies, and avail yourselves like men of every power which God has placed in your hands to accomplish your purpose within the rules of civilized warfare.' Mr. Rice, (war Dem.) Of Minnesota, declared that 'not many days can pass before the people of the United States North must decide upon one of two questions: we have either to acknowledge the Southern Confederacy as a free and independent nation, and that speedily; or we have as speedily to resolve to use all the means given us by the Almighty to prosecute this war to a successful termination. The necessity for action has arisen. To hesitate is worse than criminal. Mr. Wilson said, 'The senator from Delaware, as he is accustomed to do, speaks boldly and decidedly against the propostion. He asks if American soldiers will fight if we organize colored men for military purposes. Did not American soldiers fight at Bunker Hill with negroes in the ranks, one of whom shot down Major Pitcairn as he mounted the works? Did not American soldiers fight at Red Bank with a black regiment from your own State, sir? (Mr. Anthony in the chair.) Did they not fight on the battle-field of Rhode Island with that black regiment, one of the best and bravest that ever trod the soil of this continent? Did not American soldiers fight at Fort Griswold with black men? D id they not fight with black men in almost every battle-field of the Revolution? Did not the men of Kentucky and Tennessee, standing on the lines of New Orleans, under the eye of Andrew Jackson, fight with colored battalions whom he had summoned to the field, and whom with he thanked publicly for their gallantry in hurling back a British foe? It is all talk, idle talk, to say that the volunteers who are fighting the battles of this country are governed by any such narrow prejudice or bigotry. These prejudices are the results of the teachings of demagogues and politicians, who have for years undertaken to delude and deceive the American people, and to demean and degrade them.'

Mr. Grimes had expressed his views a few weeks before, and desired a vote separately on each of these sections. Mr. Davis declared that he was utterly opposed, and should ever be opposed, to placing arms in the hands of negroes, and putting them into the army. Mr. Rice wished 'to know if Gen. Washington did not put arms into the hands of negroes, and if Gen Jackson did not, and if the senator has ever condemned either of those patriots for doing so.' 'I deny,' replied Mr. Davis, 'that, in the Revolutionary War, there ever was any considerable organization of negroes. I deny, that, in the war of 1812, there was ever any organization of negro slaves. * * * In my own State, I have no doubt that there are from eighty to a hundred thousand slaves that belong to disloyal men. You propose to place arms in the hands of the men and boys, or such of them as are able to handle arms, and to manumit the whole mass, men, women, and children, and leave them among us. Do you expect us to give our sanction and our approval to these things? No, no! We would regard their authors as our worst enemies; and there is no foreign despotism that could come to our rescue, that we would not joyously embrace, before we would submit to any such conditions of things as that. But, before we had invoked this foreign despotism, we would arm every man and boy that we have in the land, and we would met you in a death-struggle, to overthrow together such an oppression and our oppressors.' Mr. Rice remarked in reply to Mr. Davis, 'The rebels hesitate at nothing. There are no means that God or the Devil has given them that they do not use. The honorable senator said that the negroes might be useful in loading and swabbing and firing cannon. If that be the case, may not some of them be useful in loading, swabbing, and firing the musket?'¹⁶

The question of arming slaves was then brought up and I advocated it warmly. The President was unwilling to adopt this measure, but proposed to issue a Proclamation, on the basis of the Confiscation Bill, calling upon the States to return to their allegiance – warning the rebels the provisions of the Act would have full force at the expiration of sixty days – adding, on his own part, a declaration of his intention to renew, at the next session of Congress, his recommendation of compensation to States adopting the gradual abolishment of slavery – and proclaiming the emancipation of all slaves within States remaining in insurrection on the first of January, 1863.

I said that I should give to such a measure my cordial support, but I should prefer that no new expression on the subject of compensation should be made, and I thought that the measure of Emancipation could be much better and more quietly accomplished by allowing Generals to organize and arm the slaves (thus avoiding depredation and massacre on the one hand, and support to the insurrection on the other) and by directing the Commanders of Departments to proclaim emancipation within their Districts as soon as practicable; but I regarded this as so much better than inaction on the subject, that I should give it my entire support.

The President determined to publish the first three Orders forthwith, and to leave the other for some further consideration. The impression left upon my mind by the whole discussion was, that while the President thought that the organization, equipment and arming of negroes, like other soldiers, would be productive of more evil than good, he was not unwilling that Commanders should, at their discretion, arm, for purely defensive purposes, slaves coming within their lines.

Mr. Stanton brought forward a proposition to draft 50,000 men. Mr. Seward proposed that the number should be 100,000. The President directed that, whatever number were drafted, should be a part of the 300,000 already called for. No decision was reached, however.²⁰

A deputation of Western gentlemen waited upon the President this morning....The President received them courteously, but stated to them that he had not prepared to go the length of enlisting negroes as soldiers. He would employ all colored men offered as laborers, but would not promise to make soldiers of them.

The deputation came away satisfied that it is the determination of the Government not to arm negroes unless some new and more pressing emergency arises. The President argued that the nation could not afford to lose Kentucky at this crisis, and gave it as his opinion that to arm the negroes would turn 50,000 bayonets from the loyal Border States against us that were for us.

Upon the policy of using negroes as laborers, the confiscation of Rebel property, and the feeding of National troops upon the granaries of the enemy, the President said there was no division of sentiment. He did not explain, however, why it is that the Army of the Potomac and the Army of Virginia carry out this policy so differently. The President promised that the war should be prosecuted with all the rigor he could command, but he could not promise to arm slaves or to attempt slave insurrections in the Rebel States. The recent enactments of Congress on emancipation and confiscation he expected to carry out.²¹

The whole history of this first experiment but repeats the constant lesson, that statesmen, generals, and reformers must always and unavoidably reckon with public opinion when they undertake to change either for worse or for better the complex machinery of modern society and government. The failure of Hunter's regiment was only temporary; it furnished the germ of later success. One company, under command of Sergeant C.T. Trowbridge as acting captain, held together in spite of all discouragement and neglect, and when General Saxton received the already mentioned orders of the Secretary of War, dated August 25, 1862, to organize five thousand volunteers of African descent, it became the first company of the First South Carolina Volunteers, a regiment the formation of which was begun on the 7^th of November. T. W. Higginson, of Massachusetts, was appointed its colonel, and took command about the 1^st of December. Even then recruiting was slow. The regiment numbered five hundred when Colonel Higginson took command, and six weeks or more elapsed before it was completed.²⁴

When the project of arming the colored men was discussed among the friends of the administration, Mr. Hamlin set about quietly to ascertain the sentiments of young and ambitious Union officers of his acquaintance. There were several who were peculiarly close to him, for two were his elder sons, and a third was the son of his friend and neighbor, John Appleton, the distinguished chief justice of Maine. Mr. Hamlin's sons enlisted in 1862. Charles, the elder, went out as a major of the Eighteenth Maine, and Cyrus as captain and aide on the staff of General Fremont. John F. Appleton was one of the college friends and associates of the Hamlin brothers. He was of that type of the American college man and soldier exemplified in Charles Russell Lowell, Robert Gould Shaw, and Theodore Winthrop. While Major Charles Hamlin favored the enlistment of the negroes, he preferred what proved to be a more active service in the field, and remained in the Army of the Potomac as adjutant-general of Hooker's division. Both Captain Hamlin who had served in West Virginia, and Captain Appleton who had been sent farther south, saw enough of the negro to convince them that he had good fighting qualities, and knowing the opinions of the Vice-President they wrote hm freely. Captain Hamlin was by nature ardent and enthusiastic, and when he made up his mind to carry an undertaking through he embraced it with all his energies.

In the mean time Mr. Hamlin again talked with Mr. Lincoln about the necessity of arming the negroes, and laid before him the letters he had received from his son and Appleton. He said to Mr. Hamlin, 'I do not think that the people are yet up to it,' and intimated that this was the chief obstacle. But an incident happened son after this decided President Lincoln that the time had come, and that Mr. Hamlin was right. About ten o'clock one night in January, 1863, Captain Cyrus Hamlin entered his father's rooms at Washington in company with eight or ten officers of his acquaintance and of subordinate positions. Captain Hamlin had ascertained that they were willing to take command of colored troops, and had urged them to call with him on his father to ask him to use his influence with President Lincoln to that end. Mr. Hamlin was much impressed when he heard the object of his visitors' call, and said that he and Secretary Stanton had long urged President Lincoln to take this step, but that they had failed to convince him that the time was ripe. He asked this question, 'Would you, and other men like you, be willing to accept the same command in colored troops you now hold?'

'Yes, sir, gladly,' was the general reply.

This was proof enough to satisfy even the opponents of the negro soldier that the movement was patriotic and disinterested, and he replied: –

"Very well, if you are willing to undertake the task, I will see to it that you have an opportunity of presenting your views to the President,' and he forthwith sent a messenger to Mr. Lincoln informing him that he would call at the White House the next morning at nine o'clock on important business. Mr. Lincoln answered that he would make the engagement, and with characteristic caution Mr. Hamlin enjoined on the officers the importance of presenting themselves to him 'at a quarter to nine sharp." He added: "Mr. Lincoln is a busy man, and we must not detain him a minute longer than necessary, nor keep him waiting at all."

Mr. Lincoln met Mr. Hamlin and the officers at the appointed hour. Mr. Hamlin announced the object of the visit, and also said that the officers had volunteered to accept positions of equal rank among the colored troops. President Lincoln was both surprised and moved. He had no intimation of the nature of Mr. Hamlin's visit, and undoubtedly he was touched when he heard the Vice President offer the services of his own son and those of other young officers in a cause that had aroused the strongest feelings of racial prejudice. His words show this. He first questioned Captain Hamlin and his comrades one by one to obtain their individual views, and then turning to Mr. Hamlin he asked: –

"What is your best judgment

Mr. Hamlin asked Mr. Lincoln whether he would not write the order at once. The President assented, and, sitting down at his desk, he rapidly penned an order to Secretary Stanton to form a brigade of colored men, to be officered by white men, and directing hm to remember the men Mr. Hamlin would introduce to him.

"May I be your messenger to Secretary Stanton?" eagerly asked Mr. Hamlin.

'Yes, yes," replied the President, smiling in his own quaint way, "take it to Stanton; take it to Stanton. I am glad to know that you are both satisfied."

Without a moment's delay the Vice President hurried to the War Department, found the secretary in his private room, introduced the officers, and told him the news.

"No, no, it can't be possible!" exclaimed Stanton, with suppressed excitement, hardly daring to believe that one of his pet schemes was about to go into effect."

"Here is the President's order," was Mr. Hamlin's simple response. Hastily the secretary read it, was silent for a moment, and then, throwing aside his usual gruffness of manner, his real feeling came to the surface. Great tears welled up in his eyes and flowed over his careworn face. Then convulsively throwing his arms about Hamlin, he cried out with all the earnestness of a deep, strong nature, "Thank God for this! Thank God for this!"²⁷

I have just received Your "private and confidential" letter, and hasten to reply to it by the special messenger, who brought it

You do not ask my opinion in regard to the policy of Employing colored troops; and I infer that this is a question, which has been decided. I, therefore, answer only the special inquiry proposed to me: "whether Fortress Monroe and Yorktown, one or both, could not, in whole or in part, be garrisoned by colored troops, leaving the white forces to be employed elsewhere".

I regard this Fortress under any circumstances and especially in view of the civil war in progress, as second to no other in the Union. It is the key to the Chesapeake bay and the great navigable rivers, which empty into it, and together with Fort Wool is the only protection for Hampton Roads, which were pronounced by the Board of officers, who reported on the Military defences of the U. S. in 1840 to be "the only good roadstead of the Southern coast." By an enlargement of the canals between connecting Norfolk with Albemarle Sound, it may be made the entrepot for an internal system of Military and commercial communication of the highest importance extending from New York to Newburn and Beaufort. Even now this internal channel is a most valuable one for intercourse between this Department and that of North Carolina. Without this fort it could not be controlled for an hour.

In a political point of view it is to be considered that the tranquillity, possibly the loyalty, of Maryland may depend on the possession of this Fortress by the United States, severed as that State is by the Chesapeake Bay.

Under the circumstances I think this post should be held by the best and most reliable troops the Country can furnish commanded by the most experienced and trust worthy officers. Nothing should be put at hazard as respects either.

The garrison necessary for Fort Monroe in time of war has uniformly, I believe, been estimated at 2450 men, and that of Fort Wool at 1160 – together 4610.– The estimate for both in peace was 550. When I took command here on the 2. June last I found in this Fort a garrison of 642 men and at Fort Wool 181 in all 823. To enable the engineers to go on with the work I have withdrawn the garrison from Fort Wool, and my aggregate force at Fort Monroe is 885, of which only 693 officers and men are fit for duty. I have kept the garrison thus reduced nearly to the peace standard that I might employ all my disposable force nearer to the enemy. Of the aggregate force (885) in the Fort 858 compose the 3rd Regt. N. Y. Vols. one of the best in service, whose term expires four months from today. It is my opinion that it should be replaced by another equally reliable Regiment, and that, in case of necessity, the garrison should be filled up to the war standard by the same description of troops.

The question of employing colored troops at Yorktown may be determined by a totally different class of considerations. The position is of little practical importance except as controlling the York River and enabling us to facilitate and cover Military movements on the Peninsula above Yorktown, Should it be thought advisable to resume them. After the withdrawal of the Army of the Potomac, it was decided to retain it with a view to a removal of active operations in that quarter, and also to avoid the moral effect of abandoning a place recently captured and familiar to the whole Country through its historic associations.

If it be decided to employ colored troops any where, I know no place where they could be used with less objection. The proper garrison is 4000 men. One half of that number at least should be white troops. -

In connexion with this Subject I trust You will not consider me as transcending the proper limits of an answer to Your inquiry when I say, that I doubt very much whether colored troops can be raised here. An officer from Mass. who has taken an interest in the question, interrogated the adult males of the colored population at Camp Hamilton and Newport News and found only five or six, who were willing to take up arms. The general reply was, that they were willing to work, but did not wish to fight.

I deem it not improper to say further, that the feeling towards the north among a considerable portion of the colored refugees is not a cordial one. They understand that we deny them in many of the free States the right of Suffrage, and that, Even in those, where political equality is theoretically established by law, social prejudices practically neutralize it. The distrust such a state of things is calculated to produce is not diminished by the unwillingness recently manifested in the North to receive the fugitives, who have escaped from the insurgent States since the commencement of the war, and have thrown themselves on our protection. It is a very grave question, therefore, independently of all other considerations, how far military positions, on the tenure of which the Success of our arms in maintaining upholding the authority of the government and maintaining the integrity of the Union depends, should be confided to any other class than the white population of the country. Prudence would, at least, dictate that the inferior element in the Military organization should be incorporated in very small proportion, and employed in Services of secondary importance-³⁰

From a private note to one of the Editors of the 'Era', I learn that some interest was manifested by you concerning the organization of the Negro troops in this Department, and especially with reference to General [Daniel] Ullman's1 Brigade. I have purposely avoided the publication of information respecting the organization of that class of soldiers. General Ullman has now Five Regiments nearly completed numbering about Twenty Three Hundred men or five hundred to each Regiment. I have twenty one Regiments nearly organized, three upon the basis of a thousand men each, and Eighteen of Five Hundred men making in all ten or twelve thousand men. There are also batteries of artillery, and companies of cavalry in process of organization. These embrace all the material for such Regiments that is within my command at the present time. It is necessary to possess ourselves of other portions of country within the control of the enemy to increase this strength.

When I first assumed command in this Department I found Three Regiments in existence. They were demoralized from various causes and engaged in controversy with white troops to such an extent that the White Officers of these Regiments, as well as the Colored men who were in commission believed that it was impracticable for them to continue in service. This difficulty was caused in a great degree by the character of the Officers in Command. They were unsuited for this duty and have been most of the time, and some are still in arrest upon charges of a discreditable character.

The reorganization of these three regiments by the appointment of white Officers, and the organization of two other regiments of Infantry and a Regiment of Engineers were among the first acts of my administration in this Department. They embraced all the material then within the control of the Government for Regiments of this class. On the opening of the Teche Country in April, a large acquisition of recruits was obtained. The whole of these were appropriated to the organization of General Ullman's Brigade. The siege of Port Hudson has largely increased our material, and enabled us to complete the force that I have described. The Regiments recently organized are limited to the number of Five Hundred for the following reasons.

First, the speedy instruction and discipline of these troops makes it necessary that the officers should have the most complete control over them and this is obtained by the smaller number much more certainly and efficiently than it would with the maximum number of men allowed.

Second, the skeleton organizations of Five Hundred well disciplined men enable us to add to the number whenever recruits may offer and we have these Regiments constantly in hand to receive any that may present themselves within or from beyond our lines. It was the practice in the organization of the Conscripts of France when they were required for immediate service to limit the battalions to three or four hundred men instead of one Thousand which was the maximum number. There is certainly reason for such limitation and I am sure that it will be found to be the only successful method of organization under the present circumstances.

Should our armies get possession of Mobile, or of Texas these regiments can be filled without delay and we shall have a force in this Department of at least Twenty Five Thousand good men. It is impossible to raise Negro Regiments except we get possession of the Country where negroes are. This is a fact overlooked by many persons who are greatly interested in the success of these organizations. The Regiments raised thus far have been of great service in this Department. I think it may be said with truth that our victory at Port Hudson could not have been accomplished at the time it was but for their assistance.

The number recruited could not have been increased materially up to this time. The movements now contemplated will enable me to carry out my original plan. The Command of white troops is for the reason I have stated preliminary to the organization of Black troops. I hope my command may be enlarged by filling up the Regiments now in this Department with conscripts or volunteers. My cavalry is deficient and should be at once increased.

Fifty or a Hundred Officers for the Corps d'Afrique would be of the greatest service if they could be sent at once³⁴

An extensive observation and inquiry among the colored population of the Free States, has convinced your memorialists of the patriotism and devotion of this portion of our fellow citizens and of their willingness to bear their full share of the burdens, dangers and privations of the war against the rebellion. They are willing to volunteer for the Service upon the requisite assurance that they will be placed under leaders in Sympathy with the movement. Indeed, such is their intense enthusiasm and patriotism, that if the assurance can be given them, that upon their enlistment they will be in active Service under the command of Major General John C. Fremont, your memorialists are confident that a force of at least 10.000 could be placed under enlistment within Sixty days, forming a Grand Army of Liberation, Swelling in numbers as they pass along, thus giving effectiveness to the Proclamation of January, 1863.

Pledges of enlistment, conditioned upon these assurances being given, have already been obtained to the number of 3.000 names

Your memorialists therefore, respectfully petition your Excellency to place John C. Fremont in a Suitable command, and accept the ten thousand troops offered as above, and that the necessary orders may be issued to Secure the organization and mustering of the troops into the Service of the United States; that a rendezvous be named and instructions given to the local military agents of the United States to furnish the materials and facilities required for these purposes.³⁷

In relation to the matter spoken of Saturday morning, and this morning, to wit, the raising of colored troops in the North, with the understanding that they shall be commanded by Gen. Fremont, I have to say:

That while it is very objectionable, as a general rule, to have troops raised on any special terms, such as to serve only under a particular commander, or only at a particular place or places, yet I would forego the objection in this case, upon a fair prospect that a large force of this sort could thereby be the more rapidly raised[.]

That being raised, say to the number of ten thousand, I would very cheerfully send them to the field under Gen. Fremont, assigning him a Department, made or to be made, with such white force also as I might be able to put in.

That with the best wishes towards Gen. Fremont, I can not now give him a Department, because I have not spare troops to furnish a new Department; and I have not, as I think, justifiable ground to relieve the present commander of any old one-

In the raising of the colored troops, the same consents of Governors would have to be obtained as in case of white troops, and the government would make the same provision for them during organization, as for white troops-

It would not be a point with me whether Gen. Fremont should take charge of the organization, or take charge of the force only after the organization,

If you think fit to communicate this to Gen. Fremont you are at liberty to do so.³⁸

I had deferred it until the time allotted for an answer began to run out – having been busy about the Pacific Railroad. I was pressingly reminded of your note by a visit from the committee which had called upon Mr. Lincoln & to which he had promised this letter to you. I beg you will say to the President that this movement does not, in the remotest way originate with me. On the contrary when the Committee called upon me I declined positively to enter into it, or to consent to having my name mentioned to the President in connection with it. The reasons which I gave to the Committee were simply that I disapproved the project of raising and sending to the field, colored troops in scattered and weak detachments. That it would only result in disaster to the colored troops & would defeat effectually the expectations of the Govt. to mass them in a solid force against the rebellion. No short reaching or partial plans can possibly succeed.

I told them that if I had been placed in the Dept. which the President & Secretary [sic] arranged for me when I was last in Washington & in which I should have had a suitable field for this organization and white troops to protect it – and ensure its success I could have undertaken it & have undoubtedly organized a formidable force imminently dangerous to the Confederacy. But these views were early [sic] in answer to the committee and ended my relation to the subject. I beg you to say to the President that I have no design to embarrass him with creating a Dept. for me. In my judgment this whole business is as dangerous and difficult as it is important. It demands ability and great discretion and a fixed belief in the necessity of the work and should only be undertaken upon some plan which would embrace the whole subject and then be intrusted only to some officer of ability and judgment to whom the President would be willing to give the necessary powers. He must have power and the President's confidence. Therefore I do not propose my self for this work. But I make him the following suggestions it being understood that I am thrown out of the question – namely:

Make a Dept. of the Country west of the Mppi – Louisiana excluded – send them a suitable officer – give him full command of the Dept. & the white troops – [Missouri] Govr [Hamilton] Gamble himself included – & let him draw the colored troops togather [sic] from every quarter – and organize and consolidate them. He will have the whole line of the Mppi. river for his operations – and draw the Colored men from the free North & the freed men from the entire South. In this way the west country and the Mppi river would be closed to the Confederacy by an Army of 200000 men which at the proper time could take a deciding part in the war. This is my view of the subject, but is this time yet come? Will the President realize that if this summer's campaigns are not successful the Confederacy is well nigh established? I think not. So if you think he will mix me up with the war plan makers of whose importunities he says he is tired – please say nothing to him about it. But pray don't let him think that I am moving in any direction – or by any persons to get this command. Enclosed I return the President's letter – which I have shewn to no one.

I informed the Committee that I had rec'd. it – through your self – but could not communicate its purport without the authority of the President.

Will you please make my thanks to the President for his friendly expressions in my favor and accept my very warm thanks to yourself. I have just had a visit from your Governor – interesting and agreeable as his visits always are[.]⁴⁰

On my return home last night from an abscence [sic] of several days, I found this community agitated by a rumor that a force of black troops was soon to be sent here. I do not know how this rumor became current, or whether it reposes on any just foundation. I trust it is wholly untrue.

In a community like this, the advent of troops of that complexion, will necessarily stir up deep feeling, and no one can tell to what result it may lead. It will be difficult, if not impossible, to restrain all from the expression of the disgust, which some at least unhappily feel; and that expression will provoke retorts, which may produce serious consequences.

Our people are peaceful and quiet; they wish well to the government; and cheerfully submit to all its requisitions, and so will continue, unless they are exasperated by unwise and imprudent measures. Even the practice of running the blockade, which was never indulged in to aid the rebellion, but only from personal cupidity, has, as I have strong grounds for believing, wholly ceased. There is really no necessity here for troops of any sort, unless it be to catch deserters; and the few who are here are sufficient for that purpose. But if more troops are deemed necessary, I implore you not to send the blacks. Their presence violates the prejudices of this community, and every feeling essential to good order.

Our People, of course I speak of the majority, are entirely loyal to the Government, and among the most loyal, are the slaveholders. They have done and suffered much, and are ready to do and suffer all, that may be essential, for the suppression of the rebellion, and the restoration of constitutional authority. If they do not happen to agree with you, in all you think necessary for these objects, it is only a difference of opinion as to the means, and not as to the end. They recognize you as the lawful head of the Government, and desire to sustain you, in the just exercise of all your constitutional functions, to the end that you may, according to the regular course of the Constitution, transmit that Government to your successor, with all its powers unimpaired, and its authority every where respected. They have demonstrated this resolution in every form in which a People can express its sentiments; and this, it seems to me, should entitle them to some consideration and forbearance – If the presence of these troops were essential to the great cause of the Union, they would submit without a murmer; but it is not essential, And no fair minded man can say so; and it does seem to me, the sending of them here, under existing circumstances, would be a wanton an unnecessary, if not a wanton, strain on their constancy and endurance. I pray you to forbear; and, if such a measure is now, or ever has been, contemplated, which I cannot bring myself to believe, that the order may be witheld or countermanded.

Allow me also to bring to your notice the admirable letter of Gov [Augustus W.] Bradford on Negro enlistments, which has fallen under my eye since I began to write. The general sentiments of that letter are the sentiments of the Loyal People of Maryland, and I cannot too earnestly press them on your attention.

Mr President you have known me too long and too well not to feel assured, both of my loyalty and sincerity. I think you have no doubt on either point. Then let me assure you, in all truth and solemnity, that many of those in this State, who claim to be your peculiar friends, in this state, and boast of the favor with which their counsels are listened to, are not the best informed, or the safest advisers, of what is best for the advancement of the cause of the Union, and the restoration of national tranquility, so far, at least as this state is concerned. In their impetuous zeal for one object, they are oblivious of all others and unless restrained will plunge the state and you, into terrible difficulties wholly unnecessary, and which calmer judgements might easily avoid. I should be wanting in duty to you, to the country, and the peace and good order of my State, if I failed to convey to you this intimation.⁵⁰

The delegation from St. Mary's County have grossly misrepresented matters. Col. [William] Birney went, under my orders to look for the site of a camp of instruction for and rendesvous [sic]for colored troops – See his report, this day forwarded to the Adjutant General-

He took with him, a recruiting squad, who were stationed, each with an officer at Mill Stone, Spencers, Saint Leonards, Dukes, Forest Grove & Benedict landings on the Patuxent– They are under special instructions, good discipline and have harmed no one-

The only disorder or violence has been that two secessionists, named Southeron have killed second Lieut. [Eben] White at Benedict, but we hope to arrest the murderers– The officer was a white man The only danger of confusion must be from the citizens, not the soldiers – but Col. Birney himself visited all the landings, talked with the citizens, and the only apprehension they expressed was that their slaves might leave them. It is a neighborhood of rabid secessionists. I beg that the President will not intervene and thus embolden them-⁵³

I never saw him angry but once, and I had no wish to see a second exhibition of his wrath. We were in command of what was called the Middle Department, with headquarters at Baltimore. General Schenck, with the intense loyalty which distinguished that eminent soldier, shifted the military sympathy from the aristocracy of Maryland to the Union men, and made the eloquent Henry Winter Davis and the well-known jurist Judge Bond our associates and advisers. These gentlemen could not understand why, having such entire command of Maryland, the Government did not make it a free State, and so, taking the property from the disloyal, render them weak and harmless, and bring the border of free States to the capital of the Union. The fortifications about Baltimore, used heretofore to threaten that city, now under the influence of Davis, Bond, Wallace, and others, had their guns turned outward for the protection of the place, and it seemed only necessary to inspire the negroes with faith in us as liberators to perfect the work. The first intimation I received that this policy of freeing Maryland was distasteful to the Administration came from Secretary Stanton. I had told him what we thought, and what we hoped to accomplish. I noticed an amused expression on the face of the War Secretary, and when I ended, he said dryly:

"You and Schenck had better attend to your own business."

I asked him what he meant by "our business." He said, "Obeying orders, that's all."

Not long after this talk with Mr. Stanton, the gallant General William Birney, son of the eminent James G. Birney, came into Maryland to recruit for a negro brigade, then first authorized. I directed Birney to recruit slaves only. He said he would be glad to do so, but wanted authority in writing from General Schenck. I tried my general, and he refused, saying that such authority could come only from the War Department, as Birney was acting directly under its instructions. I could not move him, and knowing that he had a leave of absence for a few days, to transact some business at Boston, I waited patiently until he was fairly off, and then issued the order to General Birney. The general took an idle Government steamer, and left for the part of Maryland where the slaves did most abound. Birney was scarcely out of sight before I awakened to the opposition I had excited. The Hon. Reverdy Johnson appeared at headquarters, heading a delegation of solid citizens, who wanted the Union and slavery saved one and inseparable. I gave them scant comfort, and they left for Washington. That afternoon came a telegram from the War Department, asking who was in command at Baltimore. I responded that General Schenck being absent for a few days only had left affairs in control of his Chief of Staff. Then came a curt summons, ordering me to appear at the War Department. I obeyed, arriving in the evening at the old, sombre building. Being informed that the Secretary was at the Executive Mansion, I repaired there, sent in my card, and was at once shown into the presence, not of Mr. Stanton, but of the President. I do not care to recall the words of Mr. Lincoln. I wrote them out that night, for I was threatened a shameful dismissal from the service, and I intended appealing to the public. They were exceedingly severe, for the President was in a rage. I was not allowed a word in my own defence, and was only permitted to say that I would countermand my order as well as I could. I was saved cashiering through the interference of Stanton and Chase, and the further fact that a row over such a transaction at that time would have been extremely awkward.

My one act made Maryland a free State. Word went out and spread like wildfire that 'Mr. Linkum was a callin' on de slaves to fight foh freedum,' and the hoe-handle was dropped, never again to be taken up by unrequited toil. The poor creatures poured into Baltimore with their families, on foot, on horseback, in old wagons, and even on sleds stolen from their masters. The late masters became clamorous for compensation, and Mr. Lincoln ordered a commission to assess damages. Secretary Stanton put in a proviso that those cases only should be considered wherein the claimant could taken the iron-bound oath of allegiance. Of course no slaves were paid for.

The President never forgave me. Subsequently, when General Schenck resigned command to take his seat in Congress, the Union men of Maryland and Delaware, headed by Judge Bond, waited on the President, with a request that I be promoted to brigadier-general, and put in command of the Middle Department. Mr. Lincoln heard them patiently, and then refused, saying:

"Schenck and Piatt are good fellows, and if there were any rotten apples in the barrel they'd be sure to hook 'em out. But they run their machine on too high a level for me. They never could understand that I was boss."

Edwin M. Stanton told me, after he had left the War Department, that when he sent a list of officers to the President, my name included, as worthy of promotion, Lincoln would quietly draw his pen through my name. I do not blame him. His great, thoughtful brain saw at the time what has taken us years to discover and appreciate. He understood the people he held to a death struggle in behalf of the great Republic, and knew that, while the masses would fight to the bitter end in behalf of the Union, they would not kill their own brothers, and spread mourning over the entire land, in behalf of the negro. He, therefore, kept the cause of the Union to the front, and wrote to Horace Greeley the memorable words: 'If to preserve the Union it is necessary to destroy slavery, slavery will be destroyed; and if to preserve Union slavery is to be maintained, slavery will be maintained."⁵⁷

A few words only. I was born in Kentucky, raised in Indiana, reside in Illinois, and now here, it is my duty to care equally for the good people of all the States. I am to-day glad of seeing it in the power of an Indiana regiment to present this captured flag to the good governor of their State. And yet I would not wish to compliment Indiana above other states, remembering that all have done so well. There are but few aspects of this great war on which I have not already expressed my views by speaking or writing. There is one – the recent effort of our erring brethern, sometimes so-called, to employ the slaves in their armies. The great question with them has been; "will the negro fight for them?" They ought to know better than we; and doubtless, do know better than we. I may incidentally remark, however, that having, in my life, heard many arguments, – or strings of words meant to pass for arguments,– intended to show that the negro ought to be a slave, that if he shall now really fight to keep himself a slave, it will be a far better argument why [he] should remain a slave than I have ever before heard. He, perhaps, ought to be a slave, if he desires it ardently enough to fight for it. Or, if one out of four will, for his own freedom, fight to keep the other three in slavery, he ought to be a slave for his selfish meanness. I have always thought that all men should be free; but if any should be slaves it should be first those who desire it for themselves, and secondly those who desire it for others. Whenever [I] hear any one, arguing for slavery I feel a strong impulse to see it tried on him personally.

There is one thing about the negroes fighting for the rebels which we can know as well [as] they can; and that is that they can not, at [the] same time fight in their armies, and stay at home and make bread for them. And this being known and remembered we can have but little concern whether they become soldiers or not. I am rather in favor of the measure; and would at any time if I could, have loaned them a vote to carry it. We have to reach the bottom of the insurgent resources; and that they employ, or seriously think of employing, the slaves as soldiers, gives us glimpses of the bottom. Therefore I am glad of what we learn on this subject.⁶⁹

Knowing your great anxiety that the emancipation proclamation shall now be applied to certain parts of Virginia and Louisiana which were exempted from it last January, I state briefly what appear to me be difficulties in the way of such a step. The original proclamation has not constitutional or legal justification, except as a military measure. The exemptions were made because the military necessity did not apply to the exempted localities. Nor does that necessity apply to them now any more than it did then. If I take the step must I not do so, without the argument of military necessity, and so, without any argument, except the one that I think the measure politically expedient, and morally right? Would I not thus give up all footing upon constitution or law? Would I not thus be in the boundless field of absolutism? Could this pass unnoticed, or unresisted? Could it fail to be perceived that without any further stretch, I might do the same in Delaware, Maryland, Kentucky, Tennessee, and Missouri; and even change any law in any state? Would not many of our own friends shrink away appalled? Would it not lose us the elections, and with them, the very cause we seek to advance?⁷¹

You say you will not fight to free negroes. Some of them seem willing to fight for you; but, no matter. Fight you, then exclusively to save the Union. I issued the proclamation on purpose to aid you in saving the Union. Whenever you shall have conquered all resistence to the Union, if I shall urge you to continue fighting, it will be an apt time then for you to declare you will not fight to free negroes.

I thought that that in your struggle for the Union, to whatever extent the negroes should cease helping the enemy, to that extent it weakened the enemy in his resistence to you Do you think differently? I thought that whatever negroes can be got to do as soldiers leaves just so much less for white soldiers to do, in saving the Union. Does it appear otherwise to you? But negroes, like other people act upon motives– Why should they do any thing for us, if we will do nothing for them? If they stake their lives for us, they must be prompted by the strongest motive – even the promise of freedom. And the promise being made, must be kept.⁷²